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NOTES
Application of the Fourth Amendment to Pen Register
Surveillance-No Justifiable Expectation of Privacy:
Smith v. Maryland
Michael Lee Smith was suspected of robbing Patricia McDonough and
subsequently annoying her with a series of obscene and threatening phone
calls. Without obtaining a warrant or court order, the police instructed the
telephone company to install a pen register' to record the telephone numbers dialed from Smith's private residential telephone. After being installed and in service for one day, the pen register tape indicated that a call
had been placed 2 from Smith's home to McDonough's home. Based on
this and other evidence,3 police obtained a warrant and searched Smith's
home, seizing a phone book with a page turned down to McDonough's
name and telephone number. Smith was subsequently arrested, identified
in a line-up by McDonough, and indicted. Smith's pretrial motion to suppress the pen register tape4 and the evidence derived from it5 was denied
1. A pen register is a device attached to a given telephone line, usually at a central
telephone office. A pulsation of the dial on the line to which the pen register is attached
records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed. The paper tape thus
becomes a permanent and complete record of outgoing numbers called on the particular
line. After the number is dialed on outgoing calls, the pen register cuts off without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver answered. There is neither recording nor
monitoring of the conversation. With reference to incoming calls, the pen register records
only a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not identify the number from which the
incoming call originated. United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
. . Claerhout, The Pen RegisThe number 341 would appear on a pen register tape as ter, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108, 110 (1970); see United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 161 n.I (1977); Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law
Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1028 n.3 (1975).
2. The Court did not expressly state that Michael Lee Smith placed the call. Throughout its opinion, however, the Court referred to "the phone numbers he [petitioner] dialed."
3. The other evidence consisted of tape recordings that McDonough had made, without police assistance, of conversations with the anonymous caller. Smith v. State, 283 Md.
156, 389 A.2d 858, 859 (1978).
4. The basis for the motion to suppress was the exclusionary rule. Pursuant to the
exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in a manner violative of an individual's constitutional
rights may not be used against the individual in certain criminal proceedings. See C.
WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1-47 (1978). The Court established

the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but made the rule
applicable only to the federal government and its agencies. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the Court, on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, extended application of the
rule to the states. See J. HANLEY & W. SCHMIDT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 4.2 (1977); M. SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 143-46 (1969); McKay,
Mapp v. Ohio, The ExclusionaryRule and The Right of Privacy, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 327, 332-34
(1973); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule. 4 Requirement of ConstitutionalPrinciple,69 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 144-45 (1978).
5. Smith sought to exclude this evidence based on the "fruit of the posionous tree"
doctrine. This doctrine, which first appeared in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
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on the basis that the installation of the pen register without a warrant did
not violate the fourth amendment. 6 Smith was convicted and sentenced to
six years' imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the conviction, holding that the use of the pen register was not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment and therefore no warrant to install the pen register was necessary. 7 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve indications of conflict between
the decided cases as to restrictions imposed by the fourth amendment on
the use of pen registers. Held, affirmed: The installation and use of a pen
register, at police request, upon telephone company property is not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and hence, no warrant is required. Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220
(1979).
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

The fourth amendment bars the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures.' The threshold question, therefore, in considering whether the fourth amendment has been violated by a particular
governmental activity9 is whether a search or seizure has taken place.' °
(1939), provides generally that evidence derived from unlawfully obtained information is
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. See 3 W.LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4 (1978). Smith claimed that the installation of the

pen register was unlawful and that all the information derived from the pen register therefore should be excluded. Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858, 860 (1978). See Jones,
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 16 (1967). Other evidence that Smith sought to
exclude was the line-up identification and the telephone directory with the marked page.
Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858, 860 (1978). The motion for suppression of the
line-up identification was withdrawn before the trial court ruled on it. Id.
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

7. Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

9. The fourth amendment applies only to governmental action. Searches by private
parties are not within its scope. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306,
312 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239
N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969). See also Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (activities of administrative officials such as safety,
health, and fire inspectors are within the scope of the fourth amendment).
Usually a pen register is installed pursuant to a request by the police or some other governmental authority. The telephone company thus becomes an agent of the governmental
authority and its actions are deemed to be the actions of the government. Hence, the requirement of governmental action is satisfied. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d I
(9th Cir. 1966); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972);
Machlan v. State, 248 Ind. 218, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967); State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768
(Iowa 1969). But see Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 256 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1977) (mere cooperation between the telephone company and the local police is not
sufficient to establish the requisite state action).
10. If a search or seizure is anticipated, the government offical must procure a warrant
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Basic to this inquiry is the fundamental principle that the constitutional
protection granted by the fourth amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to be liberally construed II in favor of the individual' 2 in order that the right of privacy may remain unviolated 3 and free
from encroachments. 14
In its early decisions, the United States Supreme Court defined a search
as requiring a physical trespass' 5 into a constitutionally protected area.16
Thus, eavesdropping on a conversation with the aid of a spike mike inserted into a party wall of an adjoining house violated the fourth amendment,' 7 whereas eavesdropping on a conversation with the aid of a
in advance. A search without a warrant is "perse unreasonable ... subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). A warrant can only be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate based
on a sworn affidavit containing facts sufficient to establish probable cause. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Probable cause exists when a man of reasonable caution
would be warranted, based on the facts and circumstances, in believing that the location to
be searched contains seizable objects. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5,
§§ 4.1-.13; C. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 719-721 (13th ed. 1973); C.
WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 47-55 (1978).
There are several exceptions to the requirement for a warrant. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(consent searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ("plain view" doctrine); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk" doctrine); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) ("hot pursuit" theory); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception--exigent circumstances). For a discussion of warrantless searches, see W.
LAFAVE, supra note 5, §§ 4.1-10.11.
!1.Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
12. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
13. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
14. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), the Court stated: "[l]llegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing .. .by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed."
15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). The requirement for a physical
trespass as an element of a search became known as the trespass doctrine. See Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
16. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47, 59 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752-53 (1952). The constitutionally protected areas recognized
by the Supreme Court were based on the protected areas expressly enumerated in the fourth
amendment. "Persons" included clothing, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and bodies,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); "houses" included stores, Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), business offices, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932),
apartments, Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), hotel rooms, Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964), garages, Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932), and warehouses, See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); "papers" included letters, Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877); "effects" included, among other things, automobiles, Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964). See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 2.1(a), at 223-24.
17. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Even though the Silverman decision rested squarely on the trespass doctrine, it signalled the Court's uneasiness with the
analysis behind that doctrine, and laid the foundation for the Court's landmark decision in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Silverman the court stated, "We find no
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detectaphone placed against a wall of an adjoining office did not. 8 The
Court also defined a seizure to include the seizure of tangible material effects' 9 and to exclude the overhearing of words. 2° Thus, a conversation
overheard by the use of a wiretap could not be seized within the meaning
of the fourth amendment because of the intangible nature of words.2 '
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States22 the Supreme Court discarded its earlier conceptions of what constituted a search and seizure. In
Katz FBI agents had overheard incriminating statements of the defendant
Katz by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of a public telephone booth and monitoring Katz's calls.23 The
statements were introduced, over objection, in the trial at which Katz was
convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the verdict, holding that the statements should have been excluded because they were obtained through a
violation of Katz's rights under the fourth amendment. 24 The Court rejected the trespass doctrine25 and the constitutionally protected area analysis26 in determining that Katz's conversation had been searched and seized
by the FBI agents. Whether the electronic device penetrated the phone
booth 27 was constitutionally insignificant, the Court said, because "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 2 Accordingly, a search
government "violated the privacy upon
and seizure took place when the
29
which [Katz] justifiably relied.",
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, attempted to explain his interpretation of the majority's opinion.3" Justice Harlan set forth a two-part
test for determining whether a search and seizure occurs within the meaning of the fourth amendment.3 First, a person must exhibit an actual suboccasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even a fraction of
an inch." 365 U.S. at 512.
18. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
19. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20. Id, see On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Only Katz's side of the conversation was recorded. Katz was charged with transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976).
24. 389 U.S. at 359.
25. Id. at 353; see note 15 supra.
26. The arguments advanced by both parties centered upon whether the telephone
booth was a constitutionally protected area. In rejecting this formulation of the issue, the
Court stated that "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily
promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' " 389 U.S. at 350;
see Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 357 (1974).
27. The government had argued under the trespass doctrine that the fourth amendment
was inapplicable because the device was attached to but did not penetrate the phone booth.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
28. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id. at 360-62.
31. The Court has never formally adopted Justice Harlan's two-part test. The Court,
however, has frequently cited that test, thus implicitly embracing it as the proper Katz analysis. Smith v. Maryland, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226-27 (1979); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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jective expectation of privacy.32 Secondly, the individual's expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.3 3 In attempting to interpret and apply the Katz decision, the Supreme Court and
the 34
lower courts have often relied on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion.

The Katz decision changed the focus of all subsequent fourth amendment search and seizure inquiries. No longer would the courts mechanically apply the physical trespass and constitutionally protected area tests.
Instead, the courts would search for the more elusive bounds of a person's
privacy right.35
II.

PEN REGISTERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Whether the use of a pen register constitutes a search or seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment is an issue that has divided the
lower federal courts. The controversy has stemmed chiefly from a statement by Justice Powell that "[b]ecause a pen register device is not subject
to the provisions of Title III [of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 19681, the permissibility of its use by law enforcement authorities depends entirely on compliance with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 3 6 Several courts, in dicta, interpreted
Justice Powell's words as indicating that the fourth amendment would
32. 389 U.S. at 361.
33. Id.
34. The term "expectation" that appears in Justice Harlan's concurrence was not used
in the majority's opinion, however. Justice Harlan's use of that term has caused some commentators to view his analysis as necessitating an inquiry foreign to the analysis in the majority opinion. Professor Amsterdam has stated that the majority opinion would protect
Katz's conversation because he justifiably relied upon its being protected, not in terms of an
actual subjective expectation, but in the sense of a claim of right. Therefore, Justice
Harlan's inquiry into an individual's subjective expectations of privacy has no place "in
either the holding of Katz or in a statement of what is protected by the fourth amendment."
"[N]either Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect of the government. They
tell us what we should demand of the government." Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384.
Another author has stated that an inquiry into an individual's actual subjective expectation
of privacy "distorts and unduly limits the rule of the Katz case." I W. LAFAVE, supra note
5,§ 2.1(c), at 230. The importance of the distinction between Justice Harlan's analysis and
the majority's analysis arises primarily in the consideration of whether certain governmental
actions may define and limit the scope of fourth amendment protection by merely diminishing an individual's actual subjective expectation of privacy. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
35. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 383; see I W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 228;
Kitch, Katz v. United States.- The Limits of the FourthAmendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133;
Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND.
L. REV. 469 (1976).
36. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). The majority opinion in Giordano did not
reach the issue of the application of the fourth amendment to the pen register. Rather, the
pen register evidence was excluded as evidence derived from an unlawfully issued wiretap
order under title III, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2515, 2516(1), 2518(10)(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1979).
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. 1979) was Congress's attempt to comprehensively regulate electronic surveillance. A Senate Report accompanying the Act stated that a pen register was a
permissible form of surveillance under the Act because the Act was "intended to protect the
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govern the propriety of pen register use. 7 In addition, the Second Circuit
squarely held that the use of a pen register was subject to the requirements
of the fourth amendment.38 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, reached
a different conclusion in Hodge v.Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. 39 Using a Katz analysis,4" the court refused to place fourth amendment restrictions on pen register records. The court analogized to telephone company billing records in concluding that there is no expectation
of privacy in pen register records because of the public awareness that such
records are maintained. 4 '
rivacof the communication itself and not the means of communication." S. REP. No.
097, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968).
In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), Justice Powell stated that the "pen register device is not subject to the
provisions of Title III." Consequently, most lower federal courts considering the matter
held that pen register use was not governed by title III. Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977); Application of United States for Order Authorizing
Installation and Use of Pen Register, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1008 (1977); Application of United States in re Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register, 538
F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'don othergroundssub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Schaefer, 510 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975); United
States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.
1975); In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486
F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. DeLeeuw, 368 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. II (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp.
523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affid inpart,rev'din part, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S.
846 (1973); In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372 (D. Mass.), afdsub nom. United States v. Doe,
478 F.2d 194 (Ist Cir. 1973); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970); United States v. Vega, 52
F.R.D. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The only exception to this line of decisions was Application of
United States for Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398 (W.D.
Mo. 1976), which, in holding that the authorization and use of a pen register was governed
by title III, relied upon the "comprehensive" language of the statute rather than the "doubtful" language of the Senate Report.
When the issue finally presented itself to the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the Court had little difficulty in holding
that "[bloth the language of the statute and its legislative history established beyond any
doubt that pen registers are not governed by Title III." Id. at 166.
37. United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Doolittle,
507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 1008 (1975); United States v. Brick, 502
F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Application of United States for Order Authorizing Installation and Use of Pen Register, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008
(1977); Application of United States for Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register Device, 407
F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Mo. 1976); State v. Ramirez, 351 A.2d 566 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
38. Application of United States in re Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register, 538 F.2d
956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159 (1977). In so holding, the Court relied primarily on Justice Powell's statement in
Giordano and on the Seventh Circuit's dictum in United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531
F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1976).
39. 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. See notes 22-35 supra and accompanying text.
41. 555 F.2d at 256. The telephone company billing records had previously been recognized by the Ninth Circuit as lacking fourth amendment protection because of the general
public awareness that such records are routinely maintained, thus negating any expectation
of privacy. United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 801
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SMITH V. MARYLAND

The split of authority among the lower courts led the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Smith v. Maryland in order to confront the issue of
whether the use of a pen register without a warrant is a search or a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.4 2 The Court approached
the issue with a straightforward application of the analysis in Katz43 as
interpreted by Justice Harlan.' In order to apply Katz, however, the
Court first needed to determine precisely what capabilities a pen register
has.4 5 The pen register, the Court noted, is an instrument that records only
the numbers that have been dialed, and not whether the calls have been
completed. The identities of the caller and the recipient of the call4 6 remain private, as do the contents of the conversation.4 7 Consequently, any
(1974); United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1971). In noting that pen register
records are not as routinely maintained as billing records are, the court in Hodge stated that
the distinction was more than offset by the fact that pen register records, unlike billing
records, do not disclose whether the call has been completed, and are thus even further
removed from the content of the conversation. Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. The Justices split 5-3 in their decision. Justice Powell did not participate in the
decision. Justice Powell's separate opinion in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), was the opinion that had become the foundation for the holdings or dicta of lower courts that the fourth amendment
was applicable to pen registers. Thus, a 5-4 decision might have resulted had Justice Powell
participated. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 22-29 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
45. In determining the nature of the challenged activity, the Court relied primarily on
the language of United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977). In New York
Telephone, which dealt solely with the applicability of title III to pen registers, the Court
stated that the language of title III indicates that pen registers do not "intercept" information
because they do not acquire the "contents" of a communication as defined by the Act. Id. at
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1976). By relying on New York Telephone in the present case,
the Court evidently assumed that the threshold standards for determining the applicability
of fourth amendment proscriptions to pen registers are the same threshold standards that are
used to determine the applicability of a statutory enactment to pen registers. The Court
failed to consider whether Congress was actually legislating with the fourth amendment in
mind, or whether Congress framed the proscriptions of title III apart from constitutional
considerations.
46. Justice Marshall assumed that the identity of the recipient of the call might be disclosed by the pen register. 99 S. Ct. at 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 234; see note 88 infra and
accompanying text.
47. Justice Stewart's disagreement with the majority is primarily on this point. Justice
Stewart argues that there is content in the numbers dialed. See note 74 infra and accompanying text. See also Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978) (Cole, J., dissenting)
(stating that information can be conveyed by nonverbal action). Some courts have suggested that communication might occur through code-calling, a prearranged signal accomplished by dialing at a certain time or allowing the telephone to ring a certain number of
times. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Caplan, 255 F.
Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966); United States v. Guglielmo, 345 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
aft'd, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966).
The Court, in its benign description of the capabilities of the pen register, overlooked the
potential for abuse of such surveillance. See Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858, 874
n.4 (1978) (Cole, J., dissenting) (pen register surveillance may be converted to a wiretap by
attaching a tape recorder or headphones to appropriate terminals on the unit); Brief for
Appellant at 10, United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976) (some
pen registers contain a voice-actuated switch that will automatically turn a tape recorder on
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claim to privacy by petitioner Smith would be vested solely in the numbers
dialed.4 8
The Court, applying the first part of Justice Harlan's Katz analysis,49
sought to determine whether Smith had exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. The Court doubted that people in general have any
actual expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial, reasoning that all telephone users know that the numbers they dial are conveyed
to telephone company switching equipment and that the telephone company can record the numbers dialed because users see a list of their longdistance calls in their monthly bills. 50 Furthermore, most telephone books
inform customers that the telephone company has the facilities to help
identify annoyance calls. The Court found it "too much to believe"'" that
people actually expect the numbers they dial to remain private.52
Based on its perception of the public's expectations in general, the Court
found that Smith could not have had an actual expectation of privacy in
dialing McDonough's number.5 3 The Court rejected the argument that
Smith had demonstrated this expectation of privacy by using his home
telephone. The use of his private residential telephone might manifest the
petitioner's expectation that the contents of his conversation would remain
private. Such use could not, however, demonstrate an expectation to keep
private the number dialed because, regardless of where the petitioner
called from,' he had to convey the number he dialed to the telephone
company in order to complete his call.5"
In considering the second part of the Katz analysis, the Court concluded
that, even if Smith had demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy,
society was not prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. 56
This conclusion is based upon the principle that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information he voluntarily gives to third parand off). See also In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 377 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975). One commentator
noted that Congress, in not including the pen register within the proscriptions of title III,
might not have appreciated the potential for pen register abuse. Note, Circumventing Title
III, The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law Enforcement, 1977 DUKE L.J. 751, 759.
48. Even though Katz overruled both Olmstead and Goldman, the Court in Smith indicated that had there been a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area, the focus
of the inquiry into the applicability of fourth amendment protection would have been different. 99 S. Ct. at 2580-81, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 227; see notes 15-29 supra and accompanying text.
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
50. 99 S.Ct. at 2581, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 227-28.
51. Id.
52. See note 78 infra and accompanying text. But see Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 261 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring) (merely because pen
register may be used by telephone company for internal purposes does not mean that fourth
amendment would permit use of pen register to investigate crime that is unrelated to delivery of telephone service).
53. 99 S.Ct. at 2581, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29.
54. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in
which Justice Harlan stated: "Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy."
55. 99 S.Ct. at 2581, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29.
56. Id. at 2582, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 229.
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ties.57 Under such circumstances, a person assumes the risk of disclosure.58 The Court analogized Smith's conduct to the bank depositor's
conduct in United States v. Afiller.59 Even as the bank depositor voluntarily revealed financial information to the bank, and thus took the risk that
the bank would reveal it to the government, so Smith voluntarily conveyed
McDonough's phone number to the telephone company and thus took the
risk that the telephone company would convey that information to the
government. 60 In assuming this risk of disclosure, any expectation of privacy in that information became unreasonable. 6'
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that his expectation
of privacy was one society would recognize as reasonable because the
numbers were conveyed to electronic switching equipment rather than to a
live operator. 62 The petitioner had argued that while a live operator could
remember or record numbers, the switching equipment through which his
calls had been conveyed could not do so unless so programmed. Therefore, since switching equipment does not normally record local calls such
as the ones the petitioner made, his expectation of privacy was legitimate.
The Court stated that such analysis would make a "crazy quilt" out of the
fourth amendment; constitutional protection would depend on whether a
telephone company has decided to automate or not.63 The Court concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated a subjective expectation of
privacy that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. Consequently, there was no search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 64
In a footnote 65 the Court addressed Justice Marshall's criticism in dissent that the majority's decision would allow the government to define the
57. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438
(1963).
58. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
59. 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see Note, No Expectation of Privacyin Bank Records-United
States v. Miller, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 146 (1976).
60. 99 S. Ct. at 2582, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 229. In Miller, however, the Court emphasized that

the bank was a party to the information because the information was conveyed in the form
of negotiable instruments. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976); see Smith v.
State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858, 872 (1978) (Cole, J., dissenting) (although a bank may be a

party to a negotiable instrument, the telephone company is not a party to a telephone call;
since the bank is a party to the negotiable instrument the bank depositor never operates on
the assumption that the information will remain private; the telephone caller, however, operates upon a different assumption).
61.

But see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (a hotel room is protected against

unauthorized police intrusions even though the occupant of the room has surrendered some
of his privacy by expressly or impliedly giving janitors, maids, and repairmen permission to
enter); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (even though a landlord may enter

his tenant's house for certain purposes, the fourth amendment still protects the house from
police intrusion with the landlord's permission); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 2.7(b).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2582-83, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 229-30.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2583, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 230.
65. Id. at 2580 n.5, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 227 n.5.
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scope of the fourth amendment.66 The Court stated that in certain instances a court might 67need to shift its focus from a subjective inquiry to a
"normative inquiry."
If, for example, the government publicly announced that all homes would be subject to warrantless governmental intrusion, or if an alien refugee expected his telephone conversations to be
monitored as they had been in the country that he had fled, any actual
subjective expectation of privacy would be minimal at best. In such instances, "influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms"6 8 would be operating, and consequently, subjective expectations
would not be determinative. Rather, a normative inquiry to determine
9
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy existed would be proper.6
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall found this concession unsatisfactory. The
Court, he said, did not explain what circumstances would give rise to such
an inquiry or why Smith's case was not among them.7 °
Justice Stewart's dissent insisted that the passing of information through
the facilities of a telephone company is not dispositive. 7" All telephone
conversations have to be transmitted through the telephone company, and
yet Katz holds that a caller has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
conversations. 72 The dispositive fact, therefore, is that the numbers one
dials can reveal the intimate details of one's life.73 Moreover, the numbers
are an integral part of the conversation itself,74 and are dialed from a
home or office, locations that without question are protected by the fourth
amendment.7 5 Accordingly, Justice Stewart concluded that the telephone
76
subscriber has a legitimate expectation of privacy with numbers he dials.
Justice Marshall also dissented from the Court's conclusion, stating that
he lacked the Court's "apparently exhaustive knowledge ' 77 of telephone
books and of the public's reading habits. He therefore would not assume
that the public is aware of the mechanisms for tracing an obscene call.
Moreover, even if the public knows that the telephone company can record
the numbers dialed for internal reasons within the company, the public
does not expect this information to be released to anyone outside the telephone company. 78 The public, therefore, has a partial expectation of privacy that may be protectible since privacy need not be "possessed
66. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2580 n.5, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 227 n.5.
68. Id.
69. Id. But ef People v. Canard, 257 Cal. App. 2d 444, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15, 29-30 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 912 (1968) (police chief authorization to monitor department telephone lines did not violate fourth amendment because offenders using phones could reasonably expect their calls to be monitored).
70. 99 S. Ct. at 2585, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 233.
71. Id. at 2583, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 230-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 233-34.
74. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (a man's
home is a place where he expects privacy).
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2584, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 231 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2584 n.1, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 232 n.L
78. Id.; see notes 53-55 supra; I W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 2.7(b).

19801

NOTES

1293

absolutely or not at all."7 9 This argument continued Justice Marshall's
disagreement with the majority of the Court over whether a person loses
his fourth amendment protection whenever he conveys information to another person.8"
Justice Marshall further attacked the majority's analysis, arguing that to
speak of assuming a risk is implicitly to speak of choice and of realistic
alternatives.8 1 The choice of either foregoing use of the telephone completely or of subjecting oneself to the possibility of pen register surveilaccording to
lance is not a choice between realistic alternatives. Thus,
82
Justice Marshall, to speak of assumption of risk is idle.
Justice Marshall's more fundamental concern was that risk analysis
would allow the government to define the scope of the fourth amendment. 83 The government could, for example, notify the public that firstclass mail would henceforth be read. Anyone who thereafter chose to mail
a first-class letter would accordingly assume the risk of disclosure. Justice
Marshall would reject the principle that one who imparts information to
another assumes the risk of disclosure, replacing it with the principle that
one assumes only those risks that should be assumed by a free society.8 4
Extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize people's sense of security
should be proscribed.8 5 To Justice Marshall, the installation and use of a
pen register without a warrant would be such an intrusion.8 6 The vital role
played by telephones in everyday life,87 the potential for uncontrolled surveillance by government authorities, and the value of telephone privacy to
such groups as unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential sources demand such a conclusion.8 8
. 79. 99 S. Ct. at 2584, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see I W. LAFAVE,
supra note 5, § 2.1, at 234-40.
80. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 455-56 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95-96 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 795-96 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2585, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 232-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id.; see Amsterdam, note 26 supra. Justice Harlan, who propounded the subjective
expectation inquiry in Katz, eventually modified his position and in United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), stated that analysis under Katz "must...
transcend the search for subjective expectations." Professor Amsterdam, also noting that a

subjective expectation inquiry would allow the government to define the scope of the fourth
amendment, stated that "[a]n actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no
place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects." Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384 (1974). See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 2.1, at

229-30.
84. 99 S. Ct. at 2585, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 233; see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Court should not "recite [any risks] ... without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society").
85.

See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

86. 99 S. Ct. at 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 233.
87. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
88. Commentators have claimed that electronic eavesdropping has a chilling effect on
first amendment rights of free speech; persons will speak more cautiously fearing they are
being overheard. King, Wiretapping andElectronic Surveillance-.A Neglected Constitutional
Consideration, 66 DICK. L. REV. 17, 30 (1961); see J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE § 2.05(3)(a) (1970); Comment, Do We Have to Live With Eavesdropping A

